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Security in Times of Transition 
When the Gaddafi regime was toppled in 2011, it left behind a security 
vacuum. Rather than a national police force, army or security service, 
powerful regional militias have taken over management of their own 
territories and the security of the people residing there. The visceral 
refusal by the regions to obey any government in Tripoli flows from the 
weak political and institutional tradition inherited from the Gaddafi era. 
Gaddafi, following the example of the previous Libyan government, 
shaped Libya’s power structures according to a tribal configuration. 
Rather than having a strong central army, as seen in many other Arab 
states, Gaddafi relied on paramilitary forces and managed a delicate 
configuration of regional and tribal power centres.  
Today, more than 200,000 men serve in regional militias. Only a small 
fraction of that number supports the central government in Tripoli. The 
central government believes that too much responsibility for order and 
security has been left to the militias, but these regional militias are 
convinced that the central state can never be an autonomous agent 
protecting its territory and inhabitants. A resolution to this impasse may 
come through the institutionalisation of the regional militias, rather than 
their elimination, setting the stage for cooperative dialogue between the 
regions and Tripoli. Patient management of such a process can help Libya 
avoid major armed violence and potentially develop a cooperative system 
of decentralised federalism. 
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Several factors have contributed to destabilising Libya: a very weak political and institutional 
tradition inherited from the authoritarian ideology of Gaddafi’s regime; a popular defiance 
towards the state as a result of the monopolisation of public resources by the clans of the 
former regime; and the visceral refusal by the peripheral regions to obey Tripoli. The Gaddafi 
regime was a dramatic experience for Libya in that it not only deprived its people of political 
freedoms but also worked towards systematically destroying all forms of belonging to a state. 
The tribalisation of power has generated a rejection of the symbols of power – the state and its 
security apparatus. The Libyan militias are convinced that the state can never be an 
autonomous agent taking care to protect its territory and inhabitants, and have therefore taken 
over management of their own territories and the security of the people residing there.  
When the Gaddafi regime was toppled, it left an anxiety-inducing security vacuum: no more 
police force, army or security services. And without security, the political transition is 
doomed to failure. Building a new security apparatus will require a minimum of trust between 
the victors of the revolution, and a maximum of constraints so as to enforce any agreements. 
However, the government has neither trust nor the power to enforce. It has neither army, nor 
police, nor security services. Unlike Iraq’s post-Saddam government, the Libyan government 
cannot even rely on the support of a foreign army while constructing its own security 
apparatus. It is subservient to militias that act as security forces and block, through their 
political partners, any government initiative that might lead to the creation of a national guard. 
To understand just how completely the post-Gaddafi Libyan state lacks a security apparatus, 
and to be able to remedy the situation, one must understand the historical mechanisms led to 
Libya becoming a state without army or national police force. 
Revolutionary regime and paramilitary forces: a poisoned inheritance 
In contrast to states such as Algeria or Egypt, Libya has never relied on its army but rather on 
its paramilitary forces. Those forces ensured that Gaddafi’s ‘Jamahiriya’ survived until 2011. 
From 1987 onwards, the people’s militias became more important than the army, which fell 
into disgrace after failing in its interventions in Chad and in its efforts to prevent US 
bombardments in 1986. International sanctions (1991-2003) deprived the Libyan army of the 
means of maintaining its military equipment and its 45,000 men lost what little importance 
they still retained. In 1991, the Ministry of Defence was abolished. The army was not 
mobilised to suppress armed Islamist dissidents (1993-1998). Its attempted coups d’état 
between 1993 and 1995 definitively disgraced it; the Revolutionary Guard and the regime’s 
paramilitary defence structures benefited from the army’s weakness.  
Between Gaddafi’s death in late 2011 and the elections in mid-2012, militias replaced the 
former security apparatuses, thus reproducing the militia-based character of the Libyan state 
inherited from the Gaddafi regime. This had been founded on a balance between paramilitary 
forces, composed of a skilful mixture of the “tribes” that had sworn allegiance to the regime, 
enabling them to be represented and participate in governing.
1
 The army was perceived as a 
threat to be neutralised, even if it meant weakening it and making it militarily incapable. The 
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army was thus unable to promote its own values and interests as a body or institution – unlike 
other military institutions in the region. Nor could it develop its own economy within Libyan 
society that might have allowed it to recycle its staff or form connections of influence.
2
 The 
political determination to sabotage the development of the Libyan army can be explained by 
the complex, subtle and contradictory relationship between the Libyan Jamahiriya and the 
state. In the philosophy of the Jamahiriya, the state was destined to disappear to make room 
for local political structures in which tribes played a fundamental role.
3
 Gaddafi’s 
revolutionary Libya was based on the model of a “just society” inspired by a “tribal” political 
model. In his Green Book, Gaddafi revealed that the tribe was “a natural social umbrella” and 
that “through its traditions, it guarantees its members social protection”. By contrast, “the 
State is an artificial political, economic and at times military system that has nothing to do 
with humanity”. Society must therefore be based not on the state, but on the tribe.4 For 
Gaddafi, “the tribe is a family that has become extended through births. The tribe is a large 
family. The nation is an extended tribe.” In fact, this tribal imagery was the product of 
contemporary political transformations: Gaddafi’s Libya was part of a longer continuity for 
the Libyan state, shaped by its tribal configuration ever since acquiring independence in 1951. 
Indeed, as historian Ali Abdullatif Ahmida shows, the kingdom of King Idris, ruler of Libya 
from 1951 to 1969, was founded on a religious order, but was also profoundly influenced by 
the tribal configuration in Cyrenaica.
5
 From this point of view, the army and state looked like 
the two obstacles to the success of the revolution. These perceptions of the state and army 
remain unchanged among today’s militias.  
Are today’s militias the products of Gaddafi’s revolutionary philosophy, according to which 
Libya was duty-bound to remain in a “state of permanent tension”? The Jamahiriya supported 
the theory of “people in arms” so that “each town might be transformed into a barracks where 
the inhabitants would train each day”, and was duty-bound to maintain this “tension” through 
revolutionary committees.
6
 In 1995, so as to conform to this principle, Gaddafi announced 
that the army had been dissolved for the benefit of the people’s brigades, which were now 
supposed to ensure the protection of the nation against all forms of aggression. After 
Gaddafi’s fall, tens of thousands of combatants gathered into brigades linked to towns or 
neighbourhoods and occupied the public spaces that had been deserted by the former regime’s 
security forces to protect the revolution.
7
 The militias had derived revolutionary legitimacy 
from their struggle with the Gaddafi regime, but they were increasingly challenged by the 
holders of political legitimacy obtained in the elections of 7 July 2012. For the political 
representatives of transitional Libya, disarming the militias and integrating them into the 
security forces is a major challenge.
8
 In the immediate aftermath of the elections, the Libyan 
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authorities gave the militias an ultimatum: “The mobile national force under the command of 
the chief of staff asks all armed individuals, groups and formations occupying army barracks, 
public buildings or the properties of members of the former regime or of Muammar Gaddafi’s 
children in Tripoli or surrounding towns, to evacuate these sites within 48 hours.”9 Clearly it 
will take much longer than two days for the government to be obeyed, probably several years, 
until a security apparatus emerges that is independent from the militias. 
Multiple and entangled security apparatuses 
In post-Gaddafi Libya, reconstructing the security apparatus is a priority for Ali Zeidan’s 
government. It has not wavered from its belief that too much responsibility for order and 
security has been left to the militias. In March 2013, the Interior Minister repeated that the 
militias and armed groups must leave “villas, houses and buildings in the next few days, or we 
will take action. We will not allow our towns to be taken hostage. The State must impose its 
will, and I ask public opinion to support us on this.”10 For many Libyans, the excesses of 
certain militias have become unbearable; they are at times seen as hubs of debauchery, 
insecurity and terror, encouraging aggression, theft and kidnapping. While the National 
Transitional Council initially put up with the militias, or even encouraged them to keep their 
arms, fearing the return of the Gaddafists
11
, the government elected on 7 July 2012 now 
intends to reinforce the programme of militia disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration.
12
  
Estimates vary, but more than 1,700 groups gathered into 300 militias are believed to have 
participated in the insurrection. More than 150,000 Libyans were considered armed in 2012; 
in 2013 there were between 200,000 and 250,000. For the authorities, the militias – who had 
made it possible to maintain a certain level of order in the immediate aftermath of the fall of 
regime – must eventually be disarmed and join either the new Libyan army or the security 
forces of the Ministry of the Interior. However, military chiefs insist that 70% of the new 
Libyan army – which paraded in Tripoli on 9 February 2013 in its new NIMR II and 
Mitsubishi L200 vehicles – must be made up of recruits from outside the militias, so as to 
guarantee the army’s independence. In theory, its new format is estimated at 100,000 men, 
and its philosophy is to be “an intelligent army”, according to Adel Othman, the Ministry of 
Defence spokesperson. Meanwhile, the army uses auxiliary forces (the Libyan Shield Forces), 
made up of militias that act – at least in principle – under the command of the Supreme 
Security Council (SCC) and the revolutionary coalitions. The instructors and trainers of the 
new army are made up of some of the officers who served the former regime but resigned 
before its fall or refused to fight the insurgents.
13
 In contrast with Iraq, the Libyan authorities 
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have not struck off and excluded all staff linked to the former regime, despite the temptation 
to do so – far from it! Ashur Shuwail, the Minister of the Interior, has revealed that there are 
more than 120,000 police and 40,000 administrative staff in his ministry, but that many of 
them have not worked for four or five years, despite continuing to receive their salaries.
14
  
In fact, two years after the regime was toppled, the numbers of army soldiers and policemen 
are derisory compared to those of the battalions and brigades which make up the Supreme 
Security Council and the Libyan Shield Forces: about 200,000 men with fluctuating loyalties. 
The army is believed to be 6,000 men strong, divided into four brigades (one of commandos 
and three of infantry), and only 1,000 men are supposedly ready for operations! Rather than 
join the army or police force, more than 76,000 militiamen have preferred to start a company 
or business while keeping their arms.
15
 The government is too weak to enforce obedience: the 
authorities permanently have to negotiate their own survival, being under threat by those who 
were not elected by voters but whose commitment to the revolution recommends them – the 
militias. The state is a virtual one, without authority; it is the militias who control Libya and 
not the government, as recognised by many experts and Libyan academics. Parliament has 
become the seat of militia representatives, not of voters’ representatives. In fact, the problem 
is not so much that the militias “control Libya” – many Libyans acknowledge that, without 
the militias, Libya would have slipped into general chaos – but rather that the majority of 
militias do not trust the government, in particular, and political institutions in general, and that 
some militias are drifting into becoming mafia-style organisations. The militias project onto 
the state the same reticence as Gaddafi. Previously, Gaddafi’s tribe had exclusive control over 
Libya’s oil resources; now, it has been replaced by dozens of militias, sometimes backed by 
“tribes”.16 The militias have blocked the export of hydrocarbons and cut the government’s 
resources so as to impose their own political agenda – as have the militias in Cyrenaica, who 
aspire to separate from the Libyan state and create an autonomous region.  
The impossibility of creating a security apparatus capable of making Libya safe – and thus the 
impossibility of creating new political institutions – underlines the determination of those who 
participated in the revolution (militias and political parties) to work towards the construction 
of a decentralised federal state. The regions (Cyrenaica, the South, the Berber region of 
Djebel Nefoussa, etc.) aspire to autonomy both in terms of finances (control over oil ports and 
borders) and security. They have literally strangled Tripoli, causing the collapse of 
hydrocarbon exports and forcing the government to acknowledge its own weakness. For the 
international community, Tripoli’s directives are so insubstantial as to make the revolt of the 
regions look like chaos. In fact, this chaos has produced a new federal and decentralised state 
– the state for which Libyans carried out the revolution. Libya is no exception in the region, 
where local populations from northern Mali to southern Algeria to the southern provinces of 
Morocco aspire to autonomous and decentralised forms of managing their own territories. The 
era of “national armies” controlling territories is being challenged. Yesterday’s Libya has 
ceased to exist and today’s Libyans will use all means – including civil war – to prevent the 
return of a central authority to their territory. Some Libyan regions believe themselves 
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capable of coping – like Kurdistan in Iraq – within a federal framework. The apparent 
disorder in Libya is in fact a historical moment of reconfiguring affiliations: the militias will 
join security apparatuses only if the latter have a perimeter that is restricted to regions or even 
towns. The Libyan government and its international partners need to understand that the 
Libyan revolution is a revolution of the regions and rural areas against a central authority, an 
authority which has been perceived for the last half-century as being abusive and arbitrary. 
Reconstructing the bonds that unite Libyans will take time. A dynamic must be found that 
will make it possible to reverse Libyans’ historic defiance against state security apparatuses 
and allow them to flourish. 
For Libya, gaining control over its borders symbolizes the hope of a return of the state, but the 
situation is different for each country in North Africa. In Algeria, the discourse on border 
insecurity after the Arab Spring highlights public fears about the implosion of Algeria and 
strengthens the state agencies responsible for security. In Morocco, border insecurity is 
reflected in the development of a project to build a wall of barbed wire at the border with 
Algeria, highlighting the exceptionality of Morocco in this region.
17
 As for Tunisia, facing 
terrorist violence, the government emphasizes that “the Algerian experience of the (anti-
terrorist) fight is interesting." Tunisians discovered with horror, after the battle in Jebel 
Chaambi near the Algerian border in 2013, that Tunisia has become a sanctuary for jihadist 
organizations. In May 2013, the Tunisian National Guard and the Algerian Gendarmerie 
Nationale established an “experience exchange” program. While it is easy to observe 
convergences in the security field between Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, it is more difficult to 
analyse the impact of the Tunisian democratic experience on the region, as each country has 
its own characteristics and history. The Tunisian experience seems more like a lesson to learn 
from than a model to follow, though the compromise reached by Tunisians regarding the new 
constitution offers hope of seeing consolidation of the first democracy in North Africa.  
The conditions that have allowed Tunisia to succeed while Libya has struggled are not so 
much related to differences in economic levels as to a prerequisite that had been stressed by 
Dankwart Rustow: national unity.
18
 The confrontation among Libyan elites (whether in 
militias, tribes or government) does not lead toward a democracy like Tunisia because the 
stakes of the conflict relate to the reconfiguration of state sovereignty over the territory, rather 
than simply to new rules for establishing a representative government. In Algeria, Prime 
Minister A. Sellal stressed that Algeria had managed to close the windows to the intrusion of 
the Arab revolutions, referring to them as mosquitos, for which insecticides were readily 
available. The official discourse in Algeria is based on stability and security and corresponds 
to that of Ben Ali in Tunisia. Regional instability is a reality and Algeria has the military 
means to secure its territory. However, using the regional threat as an excuse to prevent 
citizen involvement in the management of state affairs is a poor argument. The authorities 
fabricate the story of Algeria as a victim of potential plots and call for the people to join with 
the regime. It seems that the authorities fear that the change in Algeria cannot be done except 
with violence. Democratic forces must display education and maturity in reassuring national 
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leaders that the worst is still ahead if they don’t recognize that through their own actions they 
are creating the conditions of chaos that they fear. 
While the stability of Algeria is in question, in Libya it is the very existence of the state that is 
at stake. The dynamics of territorial logic favour the emergence of a political entity that not 
only avoids the authorities in Tripoli, but develops empowerment strategies enabling them to 
survive and grow beyond the national framework. Maintaining the Libyan state thus requires 
a federal construction, the only form of organisation that can banish the spectre, not of civil 
war, but of a war of secession between regions that feel they no longer have any interest in 
accepting central authority. The offer of a constitution establishing a decentralized federal 
state is the only alternative to war that is looming in Libya. 
 
